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I. INTRODUCTION
 Steven Avery captured America’s attention when Making a Murderer premiered 
on Netflix on December 18, 2015.1 The country watched in awe as he was finally 
exonerated by DNA evidence, after serving eighteen years in prison for a crime he 
did not commit.2 The most troubling part: Avery presented sixteen strong alibi 
witnesses at his trial, and yet was still convicted of rape, almost solely on the bases of 
a physical description and a photo array.3 Unfortunately, what happened to Avery is 
not uncommon. Eyewitness misidentifications are the leading cause of false 
convictions in the United States.4 In the courtroom, eyewitness identifications are 
compelling pieces of evidence.5 Eyewitness misidentifications have played a role in 
more than sixty per cent of convictions that were subsequently overturned on the 
basis of DNA evidence.6
 The statistics in Louisiana are just as dire. Yet remarkably, Louisiana has a per se 
ban on expert testimony about the problems with eyewitness identification.7 As of this 
writing, forty-seven individuals convicted of crimes in Louisiana have been exonerated 
1. Making a Murderer (Netf lix 2015). The series was filmed over a ten-year period and follows Steven 
Avery as he is exonerated in a rape case only to then be convicted in a murder case. See Over 10 Years, 2 
Filmmakers Documented the ‘Making’ of a Murderer, NPR (Jan. 5, 2016, 4:38 AM), http://www.npr.
org/2016/01/05/461908092/over-10-years-two-filmakers-documented-the-making-a-murderer; Daniel 
Victor, Steven Avery, of ‘Making a Murderer,’ Eyes Freedom After Co-Defendant’s Conviction Is Overturned, 
N.Y. Times (Aug. 18, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2blmV37.
2. Steven Avery, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/cases/steven-avery (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017). Steven Avery was exonerated from the rape conviction after hairs recovered from the 
crime scene were tested using the FBI DNA database and identified as belonging to Gregory Allen, not 
Steven Avery. Id. The charges against Avery were subsequently dropped, the case was dismissed, and he 
was released from prison. Id.
3. Id.
4. See George Vallas, A Survey of Federal and State Standards for the Admission of Expert Testimony on the 
Reliability of Eyewitnesses, 39 Am. J. Crim. L. 97, 98, 100 (2011); Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness 
Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 615, 615; Richard A. Wise et al., An Examination of 
the Causes and Solutions to Eyewitness Error, Frontiers Psychiatry, Aug. 2014, at 1, 1.
5. Police Exec. Research Forum, A National Survey of Eyewitness Identification Procedures 
in Law Enforcement Agencies, at iii (2013).
6. See The National Registry of Exonerations, Univ. Mich. L. Sch., http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/detaillist.aspx (follow “DNA” hyperlink in “DNA” dropdown list; then follow 
“MWID” hyperlink in “MWID” dropdown list) (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). The statistics from the 
National Registry of Exonerations account for the period in which DNA evidence has been used to 
exonerate convicted persons, with the earliest cases occurring in 1989. See generally id. (follow “Reset All 
Filters” hyperlink).
7. Louisiana is one of only two states to have this ban; the other state is Nebraska. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 11, Henry v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 402 (2015) (mem.) (No. 15-50), 2015 WL 4267855, at 
*11. Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit is the only circuit court to have a per se ban. Id.; Lauren Tallent, 
Note, Through the Lens of Federal Evidence Rule 403: An Examination of Eyewitness Identification Expert 
Testimony Admissibility in the Federal Circuit Courts, 68 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 765, 792 (2011).
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since 1989.8 Twenty-three of those cases involved a mistaken identification.9 
Additionally, Louisiana has not yet implemented any legislation or policies ensuring 
that best police practices are used during eyewitness identification procedures.10
 A recent Louisiana case involving Jerry Harris demonstrates the substantial 
power of eyewitness identifications, even when the eyewitness is mistaken. Harris, a 
seventeen-year-old, was nearly arrested and prosecuted because an eyewitness 
identified him in a six-person lineup.11 Fortunately, Harris was wearing an ankle 
monitor at the time of the crime, the data from which proved he could not possibly 
have committed the crime.12 The arrest warrant was subsequently dropped.13 Had 
Harris not been wearing the ankle monitor, he would most likely have been: arrested, 
tried, unable to present an eyewitness testimony expert, and wrongly convicted, 
solely because of the eyewitness’s misidentification. This begs the question: “Given 
the reluctance of law enforcement agencies and courts in Louisiana to make common-
sense changes in light of what we know to be very risky and fallible evidence, [should 
we] all get ankle monitors[?] Just in case[?]”14
 Measures must be put in place to reduce the potential for wrongful convictions 
resulting from misidentifications. The harm from a wrongful conviction extends 
beyond the innocent person who was convicted; it also affects mistaken witnesses, 
who must now live knowing that their error cost another person her freedom, and it 
harms society as a whole.15 This note focuses on Louisiana’s failure, in the courtroom 
and by its legislature, to acknowledge the extensive literature on the unreliability of 
8. The National Registry of Exonerations, supra note 6 (follow “Reset All Filters” hyperlink; then follow 
“LA” hyperlink in “ST” dropdown list).
9. Id. (follow “Reset All Filters” hyperlink; follow “LA” hyperlink in “ST” dropdown list; then follow 
“MWID” hyperlink in “MWID” dropdown list).
10. See Eyewitness Identification Reform, Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/eyewitness-
identification-reform (last visited Apr. 6, 2017) (listing the states that “have implemented evidence-
based practices as standard procedure”); see also Eyewitness Identification Procedure Reforms, Innocence 
Project New Orleans, http://ip-no.org/eyewitness-identification-procedure-reforms (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2017) (“[Innocence Project New Orleans] advocates the adoption of all of these procedures in 
law enforcement agencies . . . .”).
11. Chris Grillot, NOPD Rescinds Arrest Warrant in French Quarter Shooting, Times-Picayune (May 30, 
2015, 9:37 PM), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/05/nopd_rescinds_arrest_warrant_f.html; 
Emily Maw, Mistaken Eyewitness Identification Could Have Sent Another Innocent Person to Prison, 
Times-Picayune (June 3, 2015, 10:58 AM), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2015/06/bad_
eyewitness_identification.html.
12. Grillot, supra note 11; Maw, supra note 11.
13. Grillot, supra note 11; Maw, supra note 11.
14. Maw, supra note 11.
15. Shirley K. Duffy, Using an Expert to Evaluate Eyewitness Identification Evidence, N.Y. St. B. Ass’n J., 
June 2011, at 41, 42.
[T]here are many adverse consequences stemming from faulty eyewitness identifications 
of an individual, including on a societal level. Of course, the most obvious result is that 
defendants are convicted and sentenced for crimes they did not commit. The impact, of 
course, is devastating in death penalty cases. Moreover, there is an adverse effect on the 
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eyewitness identifications. Most states are heeding the scientific evidence that 
eyewitness identifications are unreliable. In 2010, however, Louisiana issued a per se 
ban on expert testimony about the inherent weaknesses of eyewitness identifications, 
at the very time when other state courts were preparing to overturn their own per se 
bans. This note argues that Louisiana must accept the scientific evidence about the 
unreliability of eyewitness identifications and make substantial reforms both in the 
courtroom and in its legislature.
 Part II of this note provides background on the science and psychology of 
eyewitness identifications, specifically focusing on the factors that decrease the 
reliability of such identifications. Part III explores scientifically proven ways to 
reduce the risk of wrongful convictions resulting from eyewitness misidentifications. 
Part IV discusses problems with the current case law and legislation in Louisiana in 
light of the extensive literature on eyewitness identifications. Part V proposes three 
potential solutions to these problems.
II. THE UNRELIABILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
 The potential dangers of wrongful convictions stemming from eyewitness 
misidentifications are well documented, and were recognized specifically in a string 
of U.S. Supreme Court cases in 1967. In United States v. Wade, the Court acknowledged 
that the “vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal 
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”16 The Court again acknowledged 
the unreliability of eyewitness identifications in Gilbert v. California17 and Stovall v. 
Denno.18 Five years later, in Neil v. Biggers, the Court established five factors to be 
weighed when determining the reliability of an eyewitness’s identification19: (1) the 
eyewitness’s opportunity to view the alleged perpetrator; (2) the eyewitness’s degree of 
attention during the crime; (3) the accuracy of the eyewitness’s previous description of 
the perpetrator; (4) the eyewitness’s level of certainty; and (5) the amount of time that 
mistaken witness, who may experience profound distress over playing a role in a 
miscarriage of justice.
 .  .  . Society is not served by wrongful convictions because the objectives of the 
criminal justice system (retribution, deterrence and incapacitation) are not realized. The 
only “winner” when someone is falsely convicted is the real perpetrator of the crime.
 Id. (footnotes omitted).
16. 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (holding that criminal defendants have the right to counsel during a lineup 
identification procedure).
17. 388 U.S. 263, 271–74 (1967) (holding that the admission of in-court identifications, without determining 
whether they were tainted by an illegal lineup, was constitutional error).
18. 388 U.S. 293, 297–301 (1967) (holding that rules requiring exclusion of tainted identification evidence 
did not apply retroactively), abrogation recognized by Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993). 
Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall were all decided on the same day and “[t]he driving force behind [them] . . . 
was the Court’s concern with the problems of eyewitness identification.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 
U.S. 98, 111–12 (1977). 
19. 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972).
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has passed between the crime and the identification.20 Then, in Manson v. Brathwaite, 
the Court established a two-pronged test for evaluating eyewitness identifications, 
which uses the five factors from Biggers.21
 The Manson Court acknowledged that factors that affect the reliability of 
eyewitness identifications exist and are important, but found the five Biggers factors 
to be outdated and incomplete. When a crime is being committed, there are 
significantly more variables at play than those outlined in Biggers that can affect a 
witness’s identification, especially when the witness is the victim. These additional 
variables can be separated into two general categories: system and estimator.22 
“System variables” are factors over which the criminal justice system has control,23 
while “estimator variables” are factors relating to the eyewitness’s perception and 
memory, and are out of the control of the criminal justice system.24 Examining these 
variables is key to understanding the complexities of eyewitness identifications.
 A. System Variables
 System variables are those factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness 
identifications that the criminal justice system, especially police officers, can 
control.25 These variables include the type of identification procedure that is used, 
the composition and administration of that identification procedure, and any 
communication with the witness before or after the identification procedure.26 
System variables are especially important because, unlike estimator variables, they 
can be controlled in every case involving an eyewitness.27 Consequently, the way a 
police officer conducts an identification procedure can have a material effect on the 
reliability of an eyewitness’s identification.28
 There are three main types of identification procedures that police officers use 
with eyewitnesses: photo arrays, live lineups, and showups. The use of photo arrays 
20. Id.
21. Manson, 432 U.S. at 107, 114, 116. The first prong examines whether the police used unnecessarily 
suggestive procedures when conducting the eyewitness identification. Id. at 107–09. The second prong then 
weighs the “corrupting effect of the suggestive identification,” id. at 114, against the five factors outlined in 
Biggers to determine whether the improper conduct created a “substantial likelihood of misidentification,” 
id. at 106. This test was upheld in Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238–39 (2012).
22. Gary L. Wells,  Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. 
Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1546, 1548 (1978).
23. Id. They are “termed system variables because of their relevance for application to change in the criminal 
justice system.” Id.
24. Id. They are “termed estimator variables because, in actual crimes, one can at best only estimate the role 
of such factors.” Id. 
25. Id.
26. See id. at 1553–54.
27. Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Evidence: Improving Its Probative Value, 7 Psychol. Sci. Pub. Int. 45, 
48 (2006).
28. M. Dyan McGuire et al., Eyewitness Identification for Prudent Police, 38 Policing 598, 599 (2015).
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is the most common.29 A photo array can be presented to eyewitnesses either 
sequentially or simultaneously.30 In a sequential photo array, eyewitnesses are shown 
one photograph at a time and asked whether they recognize the person in the 
photograph.31 In a simultaneous photo array, eyewitnesses are presented with all the 
photographs at once.32 The purpose of using the sequential photo array is to prevent 
eyewitnesses from choosing an individual on the basis of relative judgments.33 A 
relative judgment occurs when eyewitnesses select an individual in the array merely 
because that individual looks most like their memory of the perpetrator as compared 
to the other individuals in the lineup.34
 A live lineup usually contains the suspect and at least five fillers,35 although the 
exact number of fillers varies by police department.36 In a properly conducted lineup, 
the fillers should be similar in physical features to the suspect and unknown to the 
eyewitness.37 The final type of identification procedure, the showup, occurs when 
eyewitnesses are shown only one individual and asked if they recognize that person.38 
This type of procedure has been recognized by courts as inherently suggestive, and 
therefore must only be used shortly after the commission of the crime and in 
proximity to the crime scene.39
 Who administers the identification procedure is another systemic variable that 
can be controlled.40 The case investigator generally performs this task, and will know 
who in the live lineup is the suspect and who are the fillers.41 Another approach is 
the double-blind procedure, in which the police off icer administering the 
identification procedure does not know the suspect’s identity, or the suspect’s location 
29. Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at 48.
30. Comm. on Sci. Approaches to Understanding & Maximizing the Validity & Reliability of 
Eyewitness Identification in Law Enf’t & the Courts, Nat’l Research Council, Identifying 
the Culprit: Assessing Eyewitness Identification 23 (2014) [hereinafter Identifying the 
Culprit].
31. Id.; Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at 6.
32. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 23; Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at 6.
33. Wells et al., supra note 27, at 63. 
34. Id.; Wells, supra note 4, at 618.
35. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 25; Wells, supra note 4, at 617.
36. See Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at x.
37. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 25. 
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id. at 27–28. For background on the law concerning showup identifications, see generally Michael D. 
Cicchini & Joseph G. Easton, Reforming the Law on Show-Up Identifications, 100 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 381 (2010). Showup evidence is only admitted if “(1) exigent circumstances prevented the 
use of a lineup or photo array; or (2) the police lacked probable cause to arrest the suspect and, therefore, 
could not have legally detained him long enough to conduct a lineup or photo array.” Id. at 382.
40. Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at 7.
41. Id.
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in a lineup or photo array.42 The police officer can also conduct a “blinded” procedure, 
in which the officer knows the identity of the suspect, but only the eyewitness can 
see the suspect and the fillers.43
 Any communication with eyewitnesses before or after an identification procedure 
can influence them. Before the procedure, the police officer may give eyewitnesses 
instructions, including a statement that the perpetrator may or may not be in the 
lineup or photo array.44 Post-identification feedback from police officers can affect 
eyewitnesses’ confidence.45 Negative post-identification feedback occurs when the 
police officer suggests that the eyewitness did not choose the right person, but instead 
chose one of the fillers.46 This causes eyewitnesses to become less certain of their 
identification.47 Positive post-identification feedback occurs when a police officer 
gives a confirmatory statement, indicating that the eyewitness correctly picked the 
suspect.48 Positive feedback may lead to wrongful convictions because it augments 
eyewitnesses’ confidence in their identification.49 Eyewitnesses then feel more certain 
while testifying in the courtroom, which in turn causes jurors to afford more weight 
to their identification. This is problematic because an eyewitness’s level of certainty 
has been shown to be a poor predictor of accuracy.50
 B. Estimator Variables
 Estimator variables affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications, but unlike 
system variables, individuals in the criminal justice system cannot control them.51 
These variables relate to eyewitnesses’ memory or perception.52 Some of the most 
common estimator variables include cross-race bias, weapon focus, stress, and 
memory.53 Estimator variables demonstrate the fallibility of memory and that 
42. Wells et al., supra note 27, at 63.
43. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 27.
44. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Pub. No. NCJ 178240, Eyewitness Evidence: A 
Guide for Law Enforcement 31–32 (1999). 
45. See Lorraine Hope, Eyewitness Testimony, in Forensic Psychology 160, 167 (Graham J. Towl & David 
A. Crighton eds., 2010). 
46. McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 600.
47. Hope, supra note 45, at 167. 
48. McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 600.
49. Id. at 600–01.
50. Id. at 601; Wells, supra note 4, at 620 (“Controlled experiments . . . show that eyewitnesses can be both 
highly confident (even ‘positive’) and yet totally mistaken in an eyewitness identification.”).
51. Wells et al., supra note 27, at 45.
52. See Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 72.
53. Eyewitness Identification, Forensic Resources, http://www.ncids.com/forensic/eyewitness/eyewitness.
shtml (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
418
ANKLE MONITORS FOR EVERYONE
eyewitnesses are inherently vulnerable to making errors, even when they have the 
best intentions.54
 Cross-race bias occurs when eyewitnesses make an identification of someone 
who is not of their own race.55 The chance of a mistaken identification is 1.56 times 
greater in this situation.56 Unsurprisingly, research has consistently found that cross-
race eyewitness identifications are “notoriously unreliable.”57
 Another highly studied factor is weapon focus. Weapon focus refers to the 
premise that when a weapon is present during the commission of a crime, it will 
distract eyewitnesses and negatively affect the reliability of any subsequent 
identification those eyewitnesses make.58 The presence of a weapon results in poor 
recall and recognition of the perpetrator.59
 The level of stress eyewitnesses are under when witnessing a crime is another 
significant factor to consider when examining the reliability of identifications.60 
Stress diminishes eyewitnesses’ ability to accurately recall events.61 Humans’ natural 
response to threats is to either fight the threat or immediately f lee; these reactions 
are “geared toward enhancing prospects of survival, not memory.”62 Therefore, 
eyewitnesses in highly stressful situations will have a harder time making an accurate 
identification.
 Finally, the fallibility of memory always plays a role in eyewitness identification.63 
Contrary to popular belief, memory does not operate like a video that can be played 
back.64 An eyewitness’s memory
54. See Curt R. Bartol & Anne M. Bartol, Psychology and Law: Research and Practice 143 
(2015). 
55. For more information on this topic, see generally John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of 
Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 Am. J. Crim. L. 207 (2001), discussing how people are unconsciously 
inf luenced by race and the problems associated with cross-race identifications.
56. McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 602; Wells et al., supra note 27, at 52.
57. Douglas Balko, Note, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: Wrong ful Convictions, Eyewitness-Expert 
Testimony, and Recent Developments, 46 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 1087, 1094 (2013).
58. Wells et al., supra note 27, at 53.
59. Jonathan M. Fawcett et al., Of Guns and Geese: A Meta-Analytic Review of the ‘Weapon Focus’ Literature, 
19 Psychol. Crime & L. 35, 36 (2013).
60. For a comprehensive review of this subject, see Kenneth A. Deffenbacher, Estimating the Impact of 
Estimator Variables on Eyewitness Identification: A Fruitful Marriage of Practical Problem Solving and 
Psychological Theorizing, 22 Applied Cognitive Psychol. 815, 819–22 (2008).
61. McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 602.
62. Nancy K. Steblay, Scientific Advances in Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 41 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
1090, 1105 (2015).
63. For more information concerning the fallibility of memory, see generally Mark L. Howe & Lauren M. 
Knott, The Fallibility of Memory in Judicial Processes: Lessons from the Past and Their Modern Consequences, 23 
Memory 633 (2015), discussing the reliability of one’s memory and memory’s role in the judicial system.
64. Steblay, supra note 62, at 1107.
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often us[es] current knowledge to understand the past event or to fill in a gap 
in the story . . . .
 .  .  . An eyewitness may replace (or confuse) a perpetrator’s face with 
another image—of an innocent lineup member, a police composite, or a face 
seen in a mug-shot or other post-event context.65
Events and people shape one’s memory, proving that memory is not infallible.
III.  REDUCING THE RISKS
 A. Best Police Practices
 Policies and legislation mandating police officers to use methods that have been 
proven to reduce the potential for misidentifications are geared toward reducing errors 
resulting from system variables. States must work toward preventing eyewitness 
identification errors, which is far easier than “detect[ing] them once they have 
occurred.”66 There are several reports, dating as far back as 1999, that highlight 
identification procedure methods that all police departments should strive to adopt.67 
Some states have made eyewitness identification reforms a priority by passing 
legislation that sets forth statewide requirements.68 However, despite overturning 
their per se bans on expert testimony about eyewitness identification reliability, many 
states have not made eyewitness identification reforms a priority, and most police 
agencies still do not have any written policies regarding eyewitness identification 
procedures.69 The National Academy of Sciences found that even when there are 
policies in place, the policies are not uniform across police agencies and are generally 
insufficient.70
 Policies and legislation should ref lect the enormous body of research on 
eyewitness identifications, and should mandate that states adopt best police practices. 
Lineups should contain only one suspect,71 and the fillers should resemble the 
description of the perpetrator so that the suspected perpetrator does not stand out.72 
The fillers should so closely resemble the suspected perpetrator that a nonwitness 
65. Id. at 1108.
66. Wise et al., supra note 4, at 5.
67. See Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 23. See generally Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 44 
(examining the effectiveness of various procedures within the criminal justice system that are used to 
collect and preserve evidence); Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5 (examining the effect 
different procedures have on the reliability of evidence). Psychologists have been making these 
recommendations for decades. See generally Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: 
Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 (1998) (comparing various 
eyewitness identification procedures to help determine which procedure is most effective).
68. Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at 23.
69. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 23; Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at vii.
70. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 103–04.
71. Wells et al., supra note 27, at 60. This is true even when there are multiple suspects. Id. Each suspect 
should be placed in her own separate lineup. Id.
72. Nat’l Inst. of Justice, supra note 44, at 29; see Wells, supra note 4, at 624.
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would be unable to identify which individual is the suspect.73 Before the administration 
of the identification procedure, there should be standardized instructions, which 
should include a statement that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the 
lineup or photo array.74 These instructions also should inform eyewitnesses that if 
they are unable to pick an individual, the investigation will continue, and that 
eyewitnesses are “not ‘failing’ if they do not choose someone; after all, the correct 
answer might be ‘none of the above.’”75
 Although there is some debate about the use of sequential lineup procedures over 
simultaneous lineup procedures,76 many researchers have found that use of sequential 
procedures reduces the likelihood that eyewitnesses will use relative judgment when 
making their identifications.77 Even if the lineup is not done sequentially, most 
researchers agree that the lineup should be a double-blind administration.78 This 
guarantees that the administrator does not influence eyewitnesses through nonverbal 
cues or through post-identification feedback.79 Additionally, double-blind procedures 
safeguard against influencing eyewitnesses’ confidence and certainty during their 
selection.80 Influencing eyewitnesses’ confidence will alter their confidence statement,81 
which the police officer should take and record verbatim after the identification 
73. See Wells, supra note 4, at 624. This prevents the eyewitness from using a “simple process of elimination 
to arrive at the suspect.” Steblay, supra note 62, at 1114.
74. Steblay, supra note 62, at 1116. “It has long been known that asking witnesses to make identifications 
without explicitly warning them that the perpetrator may be absent from the lineup or photo array 
increases the odds of misidentification.” McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 601 (citation omitted).
75. Wells, supra note 4, at 625; accord Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 107; Nat’l Inst. of 
Justice, supra note 44, at 31–32.
76. McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 599 (“While the bulk of the literature strongly suggests that sequential 
identification procedures are more diagnostic of guilt, it should be noted that there are a couple of 
studies challenging the superiority of the sequential identification effect.”). 
77. Wells, supra note 4, at 625–28 (“[U]sing the sequential lineup procedure produces fewer mistaken 
identifications.” Id. at 626).
78. Id. at 629. For a brief discussion on the double-blind lineup, see Wells et al., supra note 27, at 63.
79. See McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 600. For a study on the effects of post-identification feedback, see 
generally Laura Smalarz & Gary L. Wells, Post-Identification Feedback to Eyewitnesses Impairs Evaluators’ 
Abilities to Discriminate Between Accurate and Mistaken Testimony, 38 Law & Hum. Behav. 194 (2014), 
examining whether feedback given to eyewitnesses inf luences evaluators’ abilities to assess the credibility 
of eyewitnesses’ testimony.
80. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 106; Wells, supra note 4, at 630. Eyewitnesses may also 
inf late the amount of time they spent witnessing the crime and their degree of attention, which are 
important “factors . . . to both judges’ admissibility decisions and juries’ determinations of persuasiveness.” 
McGuire et al., supra note 28, at 601.
81. A confidence statement refers to the statement the eyewitness gives after making the identification. See 
Eyewitness Misidentif ication, Innocence Project, https://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/
eyewitness-misidentification (last visited Apr. 6, 2017). It measures their level of “confidence (e.g., ‘I am 
not sure’ or ‘I’m totally positive.’).” C. A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness 
Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 714, 714 (1994).
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procedure.82 As an alternative to the double-blind administration, if the identification 
procedure is a photo array, a laptop may be used to administer the array, further 
reducing any influence from the police officer.83
 B. Expert Testimony
 Research consistently shows that the use of an expert in eyewitness identification 
is one of the most effective ways to educate the jury on the factors that alter the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications.84 An expert in eyewitness identification 
provides the jury with the tools to make an informed decision as to the credibility of 
an eyewitness by explaining how memory works and how it is shaped by the 
circumstances surrounding the observation of the perpetrator.85 A successful expert 
will increase jurors’ skepticism, while also heightening their sensitivity to the system 
and estimator variables that contribute to misidentifications.86
 While it is true that a layperson may understand common-sense factors such as 
lighting conditions, length of time between the crime and the identification, and 
presence of a disguise, many of the factors that lead to misidentifications are not 
common sense, and are actually counterintuitive.87 Research shows that jurors are 
not aware of the many factors that can inf luence eyewitness identifications.88 
Additionally, eyewitness testimony is so compelling that “[j]urors have been known 
to accept eyewitness testimony pointing to guilt even when it is far outweighed by 
evidence of innocence.”89 Experts are needed to counteract the significant weight 
that is placed on eyewitness identifications by both judges and jurors.
 C. Voir Dire and Jury Instructions
 Other methods for reducing wrongful convictions include the use of voir dire and 
jury instructions. In voir dire,90 attorneys can ask “specific, targeted questions” as well 
82. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30, at 108; Wells, supra note 4, at 631; see Nat’l Inst. of 
Justice, supra note 44, at 38.
83. Wells et al., supra note 27, at 63.
84. Steve Newton, What Happened to Daubert? Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony in Louisiana After 
State v. Young, 3 J. Race Gender & Poverty 105, 106 (2012); Balko, supra note 57, at 1087.
85. Vallas, supra note 4, at 99. The expert’s testimony serves two goals: “it should both inform jurors that 
eyewitnesses are significantly less reliable than common sense suggests, and also should educate jurors 
about the nature of human memory and specific variables that affect the accuracy of identifications.” Id. 
86. Id. at 132. 
87. Newton, supra note 84, at 113; see Steblay, supra note 62, at 1125.
88. Vallas, supra note 4, at 130.
89. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony 9 (1979).
90. Voir dire is “[a] preliminary examination of a prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the 
prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.” Voir dire, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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as prepare the jury for issues that will arise in the case.91 However, voir dire can only 
be effective as a method of educating the jury if attorneys are given enough time to 
properly assess jurors’ attitudes and beliefs, and if attorneys are capable of making 
such assessments.92 Attorneys have no control over the length of time the judge affords 
them to conduct voir dire in each case. However, even with an unlimited amount of 
time, an inexperienced attorney will not fully be able to use voir dire.
 Jury instructions on eyewitness testimony are often cited as an alternative to 
expert testimony. Some have even gone so far as to argue that “[t]hese instructions 
are theoretically stronger than expert testimony because they reflect the opinion of 
the court as a matter of law.”93 However, studies have shown that jury instructions 
only have a minor effect on jurors’ knowledge of the factors affecting eyewitness 
testimony.94 For example, in 2012, New Jersey released new pattern jury instructions95 
“carefully constructed to inform lay jurors of the state-of-the-science on eyewitness 
memory and how to leverage that knowledge in assessing such testimony.”96 A study 
focused on these instructions found that while the instructions did seem to reduce 
jurors’ reliance on weak identification evidence, they also seemed to reduce the jurors’ 
reliance on strong identification evidence.97 As a result, potentially guilty persons 
were more likely to be acquitted as a result of the new instructions. Although this 
situation is not ideal, it is certainly more favorable than convicting innocent persons. 
As Sir William Blackstone astutely observed, “[i]t is better that ten guilty persons 
escape, than that one innocent suffer.”98
IV. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS IN LOUISIANA
 “Eyewitness identification is the most damning of all evidence that can be used 
against a defendant.”99 Most states have made progress toward protecting innocent 
91. Matthew J. Reedy, Note, Witnessing the Witness: The Case for Exclusion of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 86 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 905, 934 (2011).
92. Wise et al., supra note 4, at 4.
93. Reedy, supra note 91, at 935.
94. Vallas, supra note 4, at 131.
95. These instructions were instituted as a result of the ruling in State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 
2011). Press Release, N.J. Courts, Supreme Court Releases Eyewitness Identification Criteria for 
Criminal Cases (July 19, 2012), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/pr120719a.html. The 
jury instructions can be found at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instruction.pdf.
96. Athan P. Papailiou et al., The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness Instruction Induces Skepticism But Not 
Sensitivity, PLOS ONE 2 (Dec. 9, 2015), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0142695&type=printable.
97. Id. at 8–9.
98. Words of Justice: Roof Garden Wall—Right Panel, Harv. L. Sch. Libr., http://library.law.harvard.edu/
justicequotes/explore-the-room/south-4 (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
99. Elizabeth Loftus & Katherine Ketcham, Witness for the Defense: The Accused, the 
Eyewitness, and the Expert Who Puts Memory on Trial 13 (1991).
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individuals from being convicted because eyewitnesses misidentified them.100 
However, Louisiana has been moving backward and is behind the rest of the nation 
in terms of courtroom and legislative reforms. Even though researchers for decades 
have been calling for reforms in police practices when administering identification 
procedures,101 Louisiana has not yet responded. Louisiana has not provided police 
agencies with any guidelines to follow, and has not enacted any legislation specifically 
addressing the issue.102 Data gathered from known cases of wrongful convictions 
have shown that eyewitness misidentifications are the leading cause of innocent 
persons being convicted.103 The best way to counteract this is by attacking 
misidentifications at their source: the identification procedures.
 Perhaps even more troubling than Louisiana’s lack of identification procedure 
reform is that Louisiana is one of only two states to have a per se ban on eyewitness 
identification expert testimony.104 In State v. Young, the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that the district court had erred in allowing an expert to testify on the factors that 
contribute to eyewitness misidentifications.105 The court found that expert testimony 
on eyewitness identifications would invade the province of the jury, be more prejudicial 
than probative, and promote a “battle of experts.”106 Instead of relying on the vast 
amounts of research indicating the importance of expert testimony on factors affecting 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications, the court chose to interpret a prior decision 
as a total bar to the admission of an expert on eyewitness testimony.107 This interpretation 
created the per se ban where, arguably, one did not exist.
 In State v. Stucke, the court concluded that expert testimony on eyewitness 
identifications presents a “substantial risk that the potential persuasive appearance of 
the expert witness will have a greater influence on the jury than the other evidence 
presented during the trial.”108 However, instead of barring this expert testimony, the 
court acknowledged that the trial court had the discretion to determine the 
competence of the eyewitness expert, and found that in this case the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion by not allowing an expert witness to testify.109 Thus, the 
court in Young should have ruled that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing 
100. See Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5, at 23.
101. See supra Part III.
102. See Eyewitness Identification Procedure Reforms, supra note 10; Maw, supra note 11.
103. Vallas, supra note 4, at 98, 100; Wells, supra note 4, at 615; Wise et al., supra note 4, at 1.
104. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
105. 35 So. 3d 1042, 1043 (La. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1044 (2010).
106. Id. at 1050.
107. Id. at 1047–51. The court was interpreting State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939 (La. 1982). For a brief 
discussion of State v. Stucke, see infra text accompanying notes 108–09.
108. 419 So. 2d at 945.
109. Id. at 944–45.
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an expert to testify on the factors relating to eyewitness identifications, without 
issuing a per se ban. This per se ban was recently upheld in State v. Henry.110
 Louisiana’s failure to acknowledge the unreliability of eyewitness identifications 
has dangerous implications for criminal defendants, eyewitnesses, victims, and 
society. Changes must be made in both the courtroom and the legislature.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
 A. Mandate Best Police Practices
 “[T]he best way to prevent wrongful convictions by inaccurate eyewitness 
identification evidence is at the source.”111 Louisiana needs to focus on preventing 
misidentifications. The state legislature should use the recent reports on best police 
practices from the National Academy of Sciences112 and the National Institute of 
Justice113 to create a set of model guidelines for police agencies.
 Additionally, Louisiana should look to other states’ statutes that have been passed 
on this issue. For example, North Carolina recently passed the Eyewitness 
Identification Reform Act,114 solidifying its commitment to preventing wrongful 
convictions resulting from misidentifications. Louisiana should do the same, and 
model North Carolina’s legislation.115 Any legislation promulgated by Louisiana 
should be similar to the Eyewitness Identification Reform Act and outline the best 
practice police procedures for conducting eyewitness identif ications.116 At a 
minimum, all police agencies in Louisiana should be required to have some form of a 
written eyewitness identification policy, even if it is not fully comprehensive.117
 The Louisiana Supreme Court also has the power to keep police officers in check 
and to make certain that best practice police procedures are being used during 
eyewitness identifications. New Jersey has made changes to its eyewitness identification 
procedures after a special master (retired judge) conducted an “exhaustive study of the 
110. 147 So. 3d 1143 (La. Ct. App. 2014), writ denied, 164 So. 3d 831 (La. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 402 
(2015).
111. Duffy, supra note 15, at 46.
112. Identifying the Culprit, supra note 30; see also Radley Balko, New National Academy of Sciences Study 
Critical of Eyewitness Testimony, Wash. Post: Watch (Oct. 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/the-watch/wp/2014/10/03/new-national-academy-of-sciences-study-critical-of-eyewitness-
testimony (discussing the National Academy of Sciences’ research focusing on problems with the 
eyewitness identification procedures and ways to improve them); Josh Sanburn, Behind the Messy Science 
of Police Lineups, Time (Oct. 3, 2014), http://time.com/3461043/police-lineups-eyewitness-science 
(discussing the National Academy of Sciences’ report, which recommended new training guidelines for 
law enforcement during lineups and the adoption of the double-blind lineups).
113. Police Exec. Research Forum, supra note 5. 
114. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-284.50–.53 (2008).
115. Id.
116. Id. 
117. For example, Kansas governor Sam Brownback recently signed a bill requiring police agencies to adopt 
written policies in relation to eyewitness identifications. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4619 (2016).
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scientific research on eyewitness identification  .  .  .  .”118 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s decision in State v. Henderson placed responsibility on judges to examine 
police identification procedures.119 There is no reason Louisiana cannot follow in New 
Jersey’s footsteps. Louisiana established a Judicial Council in 1950 as a “research arm 
for the Supreme Court[, which] acts as a resource center where ideas for . . . correcting 
shortcomings in the system are studied.”120 The Judicial Council has published a 
couple of task force reports.121 Thus, a task force should be established to examine best 
practices for eyewitness identification procedures, and the Judicial Council should 
publish a final report on the task force’s findings. This would be an enormous step in 
the right direction for Louisiana.
 B. Eliminate the Per Se Ban on Eyewitness Identification Expert Testimony
 The Louisiana Supreme Court must revisit its decision in State v. Young.122 The 
court misinterpreted precedent and in doing so created a problematic per se ban that 
will continue to contribute to wrongful convictions.123 The idea that Young’s per se 
ban needs to be overturned is not a novel one,124 but it is worth repeating and 
expanding upon.
 Recent cases in other jurisdictions provide an abundance of support and guidance. 
In State v. Carr, the Kansas Supreme Court abandoned its previous per se ban on 
eyewitness experts.125 The court acknowledged the various studies in the field and 
chose to “evolve in a like manner.”126 Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Walker, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, “in light of the concerns identified by researchers 
and other courts, we are no longer willing to maintain a preclusive rule based on 
equating common knowledge among jurors with a developed understanding of the 
118. Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Rules Are Changed on Witness IDs, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2011), http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/nyregion/in-new-jersey-rules-changed-on-witness-ids.html. For a 
comprehensive list of the reforms the New Jersey Supreme Court made, see New Jersey Supreme Court Issues 
Landmark Decision Mandating Major Changes in the Way Courts Handle Identification Procedures, Innocence 
Project (Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.innocenceproject.org/new-jersey-supreme-court-issues-landmark-
decision-mandating-major-changes-in-the-way-courts-handle-identification-procedures.
119. 27 A.3d 872, 919–20 (N.J. 2011).
120. The Judicial Council of Louisiana, La. Sup. Ct., http://www.lasc.org/la_judicial_entities/judicial_
council.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2017).
121. Id.; see Task Force on Delay Reduction & Case Mgmt., Judicial Council, Guidelines for Best 
Practices in Delay Reduction and Case Management (2004), http://www.lasc.org/la_judicial_
entities/Judicial_Council/Delay_Guidelines.pdf; Task Force on Pro Se Litig., Judicial Council, 
Guidelines for Best Practices in Pro Se Assistance (2004), http://www.lasc.org/la_judicial_
entities/Judicial_Council/Pro_Se_Guidelines.pdf.
122. 35 So. 3d 1042 (La. 2010).
123. See supra notes 104–10 and accompanying text.
124. See generally Matthew S. Foster, Comment, I’ ll Believe It When You See It, 60 Loy. L. Rev. 857 (2014) 
(discussing the shortcomings of Young’s holding and the need to correct it). 
125. 331 P.3d 544, 689–90 (Kan. 2014), rev’d on other grounds by 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016).
126. Id.
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factors which potentially impact eyewitness testimony.”127 Finally, in State v. Guilbert, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court overturned its per se ban, finding its past decisions 
were “out of step with the widespread judicial recognition that eyewitness 
identifications are potentially unreliable in a variety of ways unknown to the average 
juror.”128 Louisiana is in a good position to follow these states. And it is hard to 
imagine a Louisiana court facing any backlash for doing so, since it would have 
forty-eight other states, and decades of scientific research on its side.
 Additionally, Justice Max Tobias’ concurrence in State v. Henry indicated that 
the Louisiana Court of Appeals may be ready to re-examine its per se ban in the near 
future.129 Justice Tobias recognized the inherent danger that is present when the only 
evidence presented against a defendant is an eyewitness’s identification, as was the 
case in Henry:
 In the case at bar, I cannot say that the trial court ruled incorrectly on the 
issue by following Louisiana Supreme Court jurisprudence, and more 
specifically Young, which excludes an expert’s testimony relating to eyewitness 
identifications. Nevertheless, here the only evidence against the accused is 
eyewitness identifications by individuals who were not familiar with the 
accused and no corroborative or other circumstantial evidence links the 
accused to the crime. Thus, it seems reasonable in a death penalty case that, 
out of fairness, the defendant should be allowed to call an expert witness . . . .
 . . . [Defendants should be able to do this], given that many studies exist 
that call into question the validity of eyewitness identification.130
 Justice Tobias raises an interesting point. If the Louisiana Supreme Court insists 
on maintaining its per se ban on eyewitness identification expert testimony, then 
exceptions must be made. However, there is no reason to limit expert witness 
testimony to only death penalty cases. In any case where the only piece of evidence 
against a defendant is an eyewitness’s identification, the defense should be allowed to 
bring in an expert to testify about eyewitness identifications. The cost of a mistaken 
identification is just too high.
 C. Increase Voir Dire Flexibility and Implement New Jury Instructions
 Currently, Louisiana does not have mandatory jury instructions on eyewitness 
identifications, and it rarely grants defendants’ requests to have special instructions on 
eyewitness identifications charged to the jury.131 Instead, the general charge instructions 
are found to be satisfactory. These instructions merely instruct the jury to:
[C]onsider [the witness’s] ability and opportunity to observe and remember 
the matter about which he or she testified, his or her manner while testifying, 
127. 92 A.3d 766, 789 (Pa. 2014).
128. 49 A.3d 705, 720 (Conn. 2012).
129. 147 So. 3d 1143, 1161–69 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (Tobias, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 1168 (citation omitted).
131. See La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 802, 807 (2016).
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any reason he or she may have for testifying in favor for or against the State or 
the defendant, and the extent to which the testimony is supported or 
contradicted by other evidence.132
These instructions lack any specificity relating to the various factors present in an 
eyewitness’s testimony and identification. Again, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
should learn from New Jersey,133 and adopt mandatory instructions on eyewitness 
identifications. This is especially important in light of Louisiana’s per se ban on 
expert testimony relating to eyewitness identifications. The only way to educate a 
jury when the use of an expert is barred is through jury instructions.134
 Along with mandatory jury instructions on eyewitness identifications, attorneys 
should be afforded leniency when conducting voir dire. Louisiana courts should 
allow for longer voir dire so that attorneys can properly evaluate jurors’ ability to 
assess eyewitness identifications. In addition, attorneys should be granted more 
f lexibility when asking questions that touch specifically on system and estimator 
variables. By making these adjustments to the voir dire process, attorneys may be 
able to reduce jurors’ reliance on eyewitness identifications and avoid convicting 
innocent people.
VI. CONCLUSION
 Eyewitness misidentifications have already led to far too many wrongful 
convictions in the United States in general, and Louisiana in particular. Louisiana 
courts and its legislature need to inform themselves about the research conducted on 
the factors affecting the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Three ways in which 
Louisiana can, and must, improve are by: implementing legislation mandating police 
agencies to use best practice police protocols during eyewitness identification 
procedures, eliminating the per se ban to eyewitness expert testimony, and modifying 
the state’s voir dire rules and standard jury instructions. Until Louisiana makes 
eyewitness identification reform a priority, it seems ankle monitors for everyone 
might be the only viable defense against the danger of mistaken eyewitness 
identifications and wrongful convictions.
132. State v. Velez, 588 So. 2d 116, 136 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
133. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011); see discussion supra pp. 424–25.
134. Supra Part III.C.
SIM CITY
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
www.nylslawreview.com
